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ONE RING TO RULE THEM ALL: INDIVIDUAL
JUDGMENTS, NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS, AND
UNIVERSAL HANDCUFFS
Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & GianCarlo Canaparo*
One of the earliest decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States—Marbury v. Madison—sets forth one of the most ancient principles of
Anglo-American law—viz., there is a judicial remedy for every legal wrong. 1
Over the last three administrations, numerous inferior federal courts have
taken that principle a giant step further. Those courts have decided that,
when the government acts unlawfully, they may not only remedy the plaintiff’s
injury but also protect everyone else by enjoining the Executive Branch from
repeating the same conduct.2 Sometimes labeled “nationwide,” “universal,”


J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 65 (1954) (“He [Sauron the Great, the
Dark Lord] only needs the One; for he made that Ring himself, it is his, and he let a great
part of his own former power pass into it, so that he could rule all the others.”).
* Paul J. Larkin, Jr. is the John, Barbara & Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research
Fellow at The Heritage Foundation; M.P.P., George Washington University, 2010; J.D.,
Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1977. GianCarlo Canaparo
is a Legal Fellow at The Heritage Foundation; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center,
2014; B.A., University of California at Davis, 2011. The views expressed in this Article are
our own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage
Foundation. We want to thank John G. Malcolm for excellent comments on an earlier
iteration of this Article. Any mistakes are ours.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded.”(quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23)). The irony
of Marbury is that the Court denied William Marbury the relief he was entitled to receive
because the statute authorizing the Court to hear his case was unconstitutional. Id. at 162,
180.
2 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir.
2017), vacated and remanded as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d
1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017); Guilford Coll. v. Wolf, No. 1:18CV891, 2020 WL 586672, at *12
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2020); HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, 415 F. Supp. 3d 669, 686–87 (D. Md. 2020);
El Paso County v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 655, 668 (W.D. Tex. 2019), injunction stayed, No.
19-51144 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2020); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D.
Ill. 2017), aff’d, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in
part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 182649, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (vacating only the court’s previous decision
to rehear the case en banc); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504, at *1
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“third-party,” or even “cosmic” injunctions, 3 those orders are better seen as
handcuffs, since their purpose and effect is to bind the hands of executive
officials to arrest them from doing mischief elsewhere.
Although lacking any historical pedigree in Anglo-American law,4 during
the last three presidential administrations, this practice has spread like kudzu,
vexing the efforts of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald
Trump to institute policies that each one thought lawful, beneficial, and
necessary.5 The Supreme Court has noted the issue, but not resolved it,6
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015),
aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016);
see also, e.g., Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2097–98, 2097
nn.5–8, 2098 nn.10–11 (2017) (collecting cases).
3 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in the grant of stay) (speaking of “cosmic” injunctions); Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining his preference for
the term “universal” injunction). The nomenclature is misleading. A prevailing party can
rely on a final judgment anywhere. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289
(1952); Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 452 (1932). A third party
cannot. See infra Part III.
4 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 425 (2017) [hereinafter
Bray, Multiple Chancellors]. One commentator has argued that the universal injunction
practice has roots in twentieth-century case law. See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the
“Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924, 959–79 (2020). The isolated cases that
she cites, even if read to support her claim—but see Samuel Bray, Response to The Lost History
of the “Universal” Injunction, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Oct. 6, 2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/a-response-to-the-lost-history-of-the-universal-injunction-bysamuel-bray/ (arguing that Professor Sohoni misinterprets or fails to contextualize many of
the cases she cites and dramatically misreads Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940),
a case central to her thesis)—pale by comparison to what Anglo-American courts have not
done for nearly a millennium. See, e.g., Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Sometimes, the dog that does not bark sends a clear message. Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 347 (1930).
5 See Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 457–59 (detailing a series of
nationwide injunctions thwarting different policy proposals by the last three
administrations). U.S. Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen recently noted that
nationwide injunctions have become “almost a routine step in a regulation or policy’s
lifecycle.” Jeffrey A. Rosen, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Opening Remarks at
Forum on Nationwide Injunctions and Federal Regulatory Programs (Feb. 12, 2020). He
probably feels under almost constant attack given that this Administration has been hit with
nationwide injunctions in numerous areas, such as President Trump’s executive order
restricting entry by immigrants from certain countries, his use of military construction funds
to build a border wall, his policy of letting states opt out of refugee resettlement programs,
and his change to the way the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services calculates the
duration of illegal aliens’ unlawful presence in the country—to name just a few. See Bray,
Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 459.
6 See Trump v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (mem.) (order granting
certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454 (U.S.
petition for cert filed Oct. 3, 2019) (Question Presented No. 3: “Whether the court of appeals
erred in affirming a nationwide preliminary injunction barring implementation of the final
rules.”); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 601 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of
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although Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch have decried the
practice in their separate opinions.7 The issue has shown no signs of going
away, so the Court is likely to address it fairly soon. 8
A large and growing body of literature criticizes nationwide injunctions,9
although a handful of scholars have come to their qualified defense. 10 The
literature has focused on whether universal injunctions comport with the
historic scope of federal courts’ equitable powers and are good policy to boot.
Largely missing from the debate is a fulsome analysis of whether the
Constitution or the Judicial Code authorizes federal courts to issue such
injunctions and whether they are permissible under existing Supreme Court
precedent. We argue that the answer to each question is “no.”
Parts I and II explain that no positive law authorizes universal injunctions
and that the architecture of the federal judicial system strongly implies that
they are overbroad. Part I discusses the Constitution; Part II, the Judicial
Code. Part III explains why the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v.
Mendoza11 and Williams v. Zbaraz12 disallow that practice. That Part also
addresses the policy arguments for nationwide injunctions and shows that, as
long as Mendoza and Zbaraz are good law, courts cannot bind the federal
government always and everywhere by an adverse judgment in one lawsuit.
Our conclusion is this: the lower federal courts are obliged to provide
complete relief to the party who prevailed in court—but no further. Congress is
the forum for deciding what relief should be afforded to the public at large.

stay); Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488, 500–01 (2009) (noting the issue but leaving it undecided).
7 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 599–601 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant
of stay); Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
8 The Court just this July remanded a case with instructions to dissolve a nationwide
injunction. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367,
2373 (2020) (reversing the Third Circuit’s judgment and remanding with instructions to
dissolve the nationwide preliminary injunction). In October 2020, the Court granted
certiorari in a case presenting the question whether a universal preliminary injunction was
overbroad. See Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, No. 19-1212, 2020 WL 6121563 (U.S. Oct. 19,
2020) (mem.) (order granting cert.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Wolf v. Innovation
Law Lab, No. 19-1212, 2020 WL 6121563 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020) (mem.) (No. 19-1212)
(Question Presented No. 4: “Whether the district court’s universal preliminary injunction
is impermissibly overbroad.”).
9 See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 275–76 (4th ed. 2010);
Siddique, supra note 2, at 2099 n.18 (collecting authorities); Sohoni, supra note 4, at 923
n.16 (same).
10 See, e.g., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Response, Nationwide Injunctions and
Nationwide
Harm,
131
HARV.
L.
REV.
F.
49
(2017),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/12/nationwide-injunctions-nationwide-harm/;
Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2019);
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018).
11 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
12 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

As one branch of a limited government of enumerated powers, the
federal judiciary, like Congress and the President, has only the authority that
the Constitution or another law expressly or impliedly grants it. What, then,
does the Constitution say about remedies? The answer is, not much. 13
The text expressly addresses remedies only in two places: the
Suspension14 and Just Compensation Clauses. 15 The former relates to habeas
corpus, an ancient writ requiring a jailer “to produce the body” so that a court
can decide whether the prisoner has been convicted of a crime or just irritated
the local sheriff.16 The Suspension Clause assumes that habeas corpus is
available for federal courts to examine the legality of a party’s confinement
and prohibits Congress from suspending the writ except when necessary for
public safety in the case of insurrection or war.17 As for the Just Compensation
Clause: that is a monetary remedy, payable in the same coin as an award of
damages for a contract breach or tort. The Clause guarantees a property
owner “just compensation”—viz., the fair market value of the property taken,
“what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller” at the time of the
taking18—when the government takes his or her private property. 19 What
those clauses have in common is that they limit an Article III court’s
adjudicative power to the particular dispute between specific parties. In the
case of habeas corpus, only “the body” is released, not the entire prison
population.20 In the case of a taking, just compensation is paid only to each
particular prevailing property owner for the specific amount of his own
peculiar loss.21 Courts do not revise the Criminal Code, nor do they make
land use planning decisions.
Other constitutional provisions deal with judicial remedies by
implication. Several provisions grant exclusive adjudicative, managerial, or

13 Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1969) (“The
Constitution is almost completely silent concerning the remedies to be employed for its
implementation.”).
14 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”); see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE. L.J. 1425, 1509 n.329
(1987) (“[T]he non-suspension clause is the original Constitution’s most explicit reference
to remedies.”).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
16 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *131 (“But the great and efficacious writ in all
manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the
person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner.”).
17 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–52 (2008).
18 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
19 See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987).
20 See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 136 (1807).
21 See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979).
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remedial authority to Congress or the President, which impliedly forecloses
supplementary judicial solutions. Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers” in
Congress, it defines how a “Bill” may become a “Law,” and it specifies that
“[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue” must originate in the House of
Representatives.22 Article I also vests in each chamber of Congress the
authority to judge the qualifications of Representatives and Senators,
respectively; to punish or expel a member for misconduct; and to decide
whether to impeach and remove a member of the Executive Branch.23 Article
II makes the President “Commander in Chief” of the military and empowers
him to “grant Reprieves and Pardons” for federal offenses, “make Treaties,”
“receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and appoint Supreme
Court Justices as well as “other Officers of the United States.” 24 As a result,
no court may order Congress to pass a law, expel a member, impeach and
remove an executive officer, raise taxes, or declare war. Nor may a court
direct the President how to grant mercy, manage the prosecution of a war,
make foreign-policy decisions for the nation, or staff the government.
The Article III Vesting Clause grants federal courts the “judicial Power”
to adjudicate specified “Cases” and “Controversies.”25 Those terms draw their
meaning not only from the assignment of responsibilities in Articles I and II,
but also from the practices of the English common-law and equity courts.26
That is, the new federal courts were responsible for answering questions of
“Law and Equity” that arose while they presided over “Trial[s]” in “criminal
prosecutions” or “Suits at common law.” 27 As James Madison put it, the

22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (the Vesting Clause); id. § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”); id. § 7, cls. 2, 3 (establishing the
bicameralism and presentment requirements).
23 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting the House of Representatives “the sole Power of
Impeachment”); id. § 3, cl. 6 (granting the Senate “the sole Power” to try an impeachment);
id. § 5, cl. 1 (making each chamber “the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications
of its own Members”); id. cl. 2 (granting each house power to “punish” or “expel” its
members).
24 Id. art. II, § 2, cls. 1, 2; id. § 3.
25 Id. art. III, § 1; id. § 2 cl. 1.
26 In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter:
Both by what they said and by what they implied, the framers of the Judiciary
Article gave merely the outlines of what were to them the familiar operations of
the English judicial system and its manifestations on this side of the ocean before
the Union. Judicial power could come into play only in matters that were the
traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that
to the expert feel of lawyers constituted “Cases” or “Controversies.” . . . [E]ven
as to the kinds of questions which were the staple of judicial business, it was not
for courts to pass upon them as abstract, intellectual problems but only if a
concrete, living contest between adversaries called for the arbitrament of law.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. cl. 3; id. amend. VI; id. amend. VII.
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federal courts were to resolve matters “of a Judiciary Nature.” 28 A federal
court has the responsibility to enter a final judgment disposing of every
criminal and civil case properly filed within its jurisdiction, 29 but that
judgment reaches only the parties to that case. As in the case of general civil
suits and criminal prosecutions, the court can adjudicate only the dispute
between the parties, rather than legislate in a wholesale manner by entering
a judgment for everyone potentially affected. The remedy is no broader than
the judgement, which itself is confined to the parties.30 As William Blackstone
put it, “[f]inal judgements are such as at once put an end to the action, by
declaring that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover
the remedy he sues for.”31

28 James Madison, Monday Augst. 27th, 1787 In Convention, in 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 426, 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (referencing the
United States Supreme Court).
29 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995) (ruling that
Congress cannot reopen a final judgment entered by an Article III court); Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (noting that federal courts
generally have “the duty . . . to adjudicate a controversy properly before” them (quoting
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959))).
30 That is particularly true in the case of a preliminary injunction. Its purpose is to
maintain the status quo until the case can be resolved on the merits. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex.
v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely
to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”). A
plaintiff need not prove that he will prevail at trial, only that he might be successful and
that the “balance of equities” favors leaving the parties where they are. See Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.”). Nationwide injunctions are altogether
inappropriate at the preliminary stage because, at that early stage, a plaintiff “is not
required to prove his case in full,” and “a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on
the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial
on the merits.” Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395; see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 43 (1975)
(“[A] state statute should not be declared unconstitutional by a district court if a
preliminary injunction is granted a plaintiff to protect his interests during the ensuing
litigation.”).
31 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *398. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
implement Blackstone’s simple conception of a judgment as a declaration of victory or loss
for a specific plaintiff or plaintiffs. Rule 17 requires that “[a]n action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest” so that the trial court knows which parties will be
affected by a judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). Rule 23 allows one party to act as a class
representative, but “only if” specified “[p]rerequisites” are satisfied. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a);
see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) defining those “[p]rerequisites”). Rule 54 defines a judgment
as “a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(a). It also forbids
the judgment from containing any extraneous information, such as recitals of pleadings, a
master’s report, or court records. Id. In addition, it directs the court to clearly specify which
claims and parties the judgment applies to. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Rule 58, meanwhile,
requires that every judgment “be set out in a separate document.” FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a).
The purpose of those rules is to give the parties clarity as to when a judgment has been
entered and in whose favor so that they have a clear sense of what must happen to enforce,
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What that means is this: in a criminal prosecution, a federal court can
enter a judgment before trial that dismisses charges improperly brought.32
After trial, the court can order the accused to be punished or freed,
depending on the jury’s verdict, and impose a punishment identified by
Congress in the act creating a criminal offense. 33 In a civil action, a court can
award the same type of monetary or injunctive relief available in England at
law or equity when this nation came into being. 34 That is all. The Article III
adjudicative power vested in federal courts is not a charter to substitute
appointed judges for elected officials. 35 Nationwide injunctions differ

preserve, or challenge the trial court’s decision. 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2651–52 (4th ed. 2014)
(pertaining to Rule 54); 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2781 (3d ed. 2012) (pertaining to Rule 58).
32 No one may be charged with a “capital” or “otherwise infamous crime” unless a
grand jury has indicted him for it. U.S. CONST. amend. V. No one may twice be “put in
jeopardy of life or limb” for “the same offen[s]e.” Id. Everyone accused of a crime shall
be tried in the state and district where it was allegedly committed. Id. amend. VI. A trial
court may dismiss any charges not in compliance with those requirements.
33 See, e.g., Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 330 (2013) (ruling that even an erroneous
acquittal bars a retrial for the same offense); Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916)
(ruling that federal courts must impose a sentence consistent with the relevant act of
Congress); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (ruling that Congress
must define all federal crimes).
34 See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 318 (1999) (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction
over ‘all suits . . . in equity.’ . . . We have long held that ‘[t]he “jurisdiction” thus
conferred . . . is an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of
judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court
of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.’” (first quoting Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 stat. 73, 78; and then quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306
U.S. 563, 568 (1939))); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 708–09 (1999) (ruling that the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial right applies to
common law causes of action and analogous statutory ones).
35 See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (“Our power as judges to ‘say
what the law is,’ . . . rests not on the default of politically accountable officers, but is instead
grounded in and limited by the necessity of resolving, according to legal principles, a
plaintiff’s particular claim of legal right.” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803))); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132–33 (2011)
(“Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the ‘Power’ to resolve not questions
and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’ This language restricts the federal judicial power
‘to the traditional role of the Anglo-American courts.’ . . . In the English legal tradition,
the need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute taught the efficacy of judicial
resolution and gave legitimacy to judicial decrees. . . . If the judicial power were ‘extended
to every question under the constitution,’ Chief Justice Marshall once explained, federal
courts might take possession of ‘almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and
decision.’” (first quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009); and then
quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984))); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“In part those words [‘cases’ and ‘controversies’] limit the business
of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define
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markedly from the remedies contemplated by Article III because the former
exceed the party-specific reach of the judgment and partake more of
legislation.
The Framers did not stumble into the division of labor established by
Articles I, II, and III, nor did it occur by happenstance. By the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, England already had a long history of courts serving in
multiple capacities.36 In the pre-Norman Era, the Anglo-Saxon kings relied
on the witan, a council of elders, with whom they would consult to determine
what tribal custom fixed as the law. 37 After William I became king, the witan
became known as the King’s Court or Curia Regis, which exercised legislative,
executive, and judicial power. 38 Late in the fifteenth century, a court of
general jurisdiction, consisting of the king’s councilors and common-law
judges, known as the Star Chamber, emerged as a component of the Privy
Council.39 During the English Civil War, Parliament stripped the Privy
Council of its domestic adjudicative authority, but it continued to dispense
justice and approve local legislation tentatively adopted in the Crown’s
colonies, including the ones in America. 40 The House of Lords also exercised
legislative and judicial power by serving as one half of a bicameral Parliament
and the highest court in England.41 English law therefore saw nothing
improper in the same body wearing more than one lawmaking, law-enforcing,
and law-adjudicating hat.42
The Framers also had a similar local example to consider. The New York
Constitution of 1777 created a Council of Revision that included judges as
members and invested that council, rather than the governor, with veto and
revisionary power over legislation.43 Guided by Montesquieu’s separation-ofpowers theory, the Framers considered and rejected that approach at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787,44 thereby making the point that the
judiciary should have no part in the lawmaking process. Because a universal
injunction partakes more of the nature of a “Law” than a judgment resolving
a “Case” or “Controversy,” the decision made at the Constitutional
Convention to confine the judiciary to the latter is powerful evidence that
courts should limit themselves to entering a judgment that does no more than
resolve the case at hand and remedy the injury suffered by the parties.
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.”).
36 See, e.g., James T. Barry III, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 237–43 (1989).
37 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 293,
327–32 (2016) (describing the evolution of early English law).
38 Barry, supra note 36, at 237.
39 See id. at 238.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 239.
42 See id. at 238–41.
43 See id. at 243–45.
44 See id. at 248–57.
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THE JUDICIAL CODE

Nothing in the Judicial Code grants courts the legislative-like power
some federal judges have assumed. For example, no statute defining federal
court jurisdiction permits a court to award a remedy to a nonparty. 45 In fact,
two statutes strongly imply that Congress has limited the courts’ remedial
power to only the parties to a case. One law divests a district court of
jurisdiction when a party has been “improperly or collusively” joined, 46 while
the statute creating supplemental jurisdiction limits it to claims “so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.”47 The Declaratory Judgment Act makes that point too.48 It
limits the scope of an equitable remedy to the parties to a lawsuit by providing
that that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction” a federal
court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration.”49 Nonparties are not within the case or controversy
that allows a declaratory judgment to be awarded. 50
Those limitations are not modern-day anomalies. Neither the Judiciary
Act of 1789 nor any of its offspring granted federal courts the full extent of
the judicial power available to them under Article III. 51 That omission is
45 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–1369.
46 Id. § 1359 (“A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any
party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to
invoke the jurisdiction of such court.”).
47 Id. § 1367. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 further bolsters this point. It requires
that a district court join a nonparty in the case when that person has an interest in the case
that cannot be adequately protected or disposed of without the person’s participation, and
requires the court to dismiss an action when “in equity and good conscience” the action
cannot proceed among the existing parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
48 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.
49 Id. § 2201. Moreover, declaratory judgments were unknown to the law until 1919,
when some state legislatures began to pass such laws. 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2752 (4th ed. 2016).
50 See supra note 35; cf. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S.
Ct. 1205 (2020). In that case, a district court ruled that the deadline to receive election
ballots had to be extended. Id. at 1206–07. In order to give force to that ruling, the district
court enjoined state officials, who were not parties to the lawsuit, from releasing the election
results for six days after the election. Id. at 1207. The Supreme Court reversed those orders
to the extent they required state officials to count ballots after the official election deadline,
and called the order enjoining nonparties “unusual.” Id. at 1207–08.
51 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802); Judiciary Act of
1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156; Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209; Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44; Judiciary Act of
1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433 (correcting
Act of Mar. 3,1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552); Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; Judicial
Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087; Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. For a more
detailed history of the evolution of the modern federal court system, see 13 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3504 (3d ed. 2008). Some of the aforementioned statutes were more
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significant. The Supreme Court has noted that Congress is under no
obligation to grant federal courts the full extent of the authority that Article
III would permit.52 In fact, the Court has upheld Congress’s authority to limit
the remedies available to Article III courts. 53 It therefore cannot be argued
that the ability to award nationwide injunctions is a historic incident of the
power of the federal judiciary to resolve cases and controversies.
The architecture of the federal judiciary also undermines any such
argument. Today’s federal system is arranged vertically and horizontally.
Congress divided the states into one or more judicial districts 54 and grouped
those districts into twelve circuits.55 District courts are nisi prius courts—i.e.,
triers of fact.56 Circuit courts have appellate jurisdiction, but only over the
districts within each respective circuit.57 That structure becomes important
when one considers the stare decisis effect of a federal court’s decision. A
circuit court’s ruling is a binding precedent for all district courts in that
circuit, but it does not establish the law in another circuit.58 Similarly, district
court opinions have no stare decisis effect at all. They do not bind any other
court, or even the judge who issued the opinion. 59 To put it another way, the

commonly referred to as the “Midnight Judges Act” (Judiciary Act of 1801), the “Evarts
Act” (Judiciary Act of 1891), and the “Judges’ Bill” (Judiciary Act of 1925). Id.
52 See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); see also Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973) (“Simply
stated, Congress may impart as much or as little of the judicial power as it deems
appropriate and the Judiciary may not thereafter on its own motion recur to the Article III
storehouse for additional jurisdiction. When it comes to jurisdiction of the federal courts,
truly, to paraphrase the scripture, the Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.”);
WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 51, § 3526 (discussing Congress’s control
over federal court jurisdiction).
53 See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 112 (2004) (upholding a law that prohibits
lower courts from restraining the collection of a state tax); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303
U.S. 323, 329–30, 333 (1938) (upholding a law that restricts courts’ ability to grant
injunctive relief in labor disputes).
54 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81–131 (2018) (specifying the geographic scope of the districts
within each state); id. § 132 (establishing a district court within each district).
55 See id. § 41 (specifying the composition of the various circuit courts). There also
are some additional, specialized courts of appeals. See infra note 57.
56 See, e.g., id. §§ 1330–1332.
57 See id. § 1291; id. § 1294 (“[A]ppeals from reviewable decisions of the district and
territorial courts shall be taken . . . [f]rom a district court of the United States to the court
of appeals for the circuit embracing the district.”). There are a few exceptions to this rule
for appeals of cases invoking the specific subject-matter jurisdiction of the specialty courts
like the Federal Circuit, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of Federal Claims.
See id. §§ 1292(c)–(d), 1295.
58 See Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis, Law of the Case, and Judicial Estoppel, in 18 JAMES
WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 134.02[2] (Daniel R. Coquillette, Gregory P.
Joseph, Sol Schreiber, Georgene M. Vairo & Chilton Davis Varner eds., 3d ed. 2015).
59 Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district
court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial
district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.” (quoting Solum, supra note 58,
¶ 134.02[1][d])).

2020]

“ONE RING TO RULE THEM ALL”

65

district court for the Southern District of New York must obey Second Circuit
precedents, but is free to ignore the diktats of the Ninth Circuit. 60
Finally, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the
requirements necessary for a district court to enter a judgment binding on
absent parties.61 The purpose of the rule is to avoid repetitive litigation, but
that purpose is constrained by the class certification requirement. 62 In Baxter
v. Palmigiano, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred by entering
a judgment granting classwide relief without first certifying a class.63
Nationwide injunctions cannot be squared with Rule 23 and Baxter. If courts
cannot grant classwide judgments to an uncertified class, it is nonsensical to
allow them to grant the same relief to an uncertified class of everyone,
everywhere.
Some defenders of nationwide injunctions have relied on the
Administrative Procedure Act64 as support.65 Their argument is that because
the APA directs a court to “set aside” unlawful agency action,66 a court may
enjoin the federal government from applying a statute or rule to any other
party. That argument is unpersuasive. As Professor Samuel Bray has

60 See, e.g., TM Patents v. IBM, 107 F. Supp. 2d 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Only
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the relevant Courts of Appeals are
binding on a District Court.”).
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (permitting class-wide injunctive relief only if the class
certification requirements are satisfied and the relief would be appropriate for every
member of the class).
62 See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1751, 1759–69 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the
purpose of class actions and the class certification requirements).
63 425 U.S. 308, 311 n.1 (1976).
64 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2018).
65 See, e.g., Amdur & Hausman, supra note 10, at 54 (arguing that under the APA,
courts regularly strike down policies wholesale).
66 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). The D.C. Circuit has held that the APA permits—but does
not require—courts to issue nationwide injunctions because “[w]hen a reviewing court
determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are
vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.” Nat’l
Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). In reaching its holding,
the court relied on Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497
U.S. 871 (1990), and a concern that “refusal to sustain a broad injunction is likely merely
to generate a flood of duplicative litigation.” Id. As Zayn Siddique explains in his article,
the D.C. Circuit’s argument “cannot be justified on precedential or prudential grounds.”
Siddique, supra note 2, at 2121. First, the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on Justice Blackmun’s
dissent is misplaced—aside from the fact that it is a dissent—because its permissive language
does not support the court’s conclusion that the “ordinary result” of a ruling against the
government in an APA case is that a regulation must be struck down. Id. Second, the D.C.
Circuit ineffectually distinguished a nearly identical case from the Third Circuit that
granted only individualized relief despite concluding that the regulation was unlawful. Id.
And third, the court’s prudential argument was “overstated” and “would not only foreclose
possible duplicative litigation in its own circuit but also preclude reasoned consideration by
any other court.” Id. at 2122–23.
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explained, “[n]ational injunctions were not contemplated when the APA was
enacted [in 1946].”67 Moreover, when the APA was enacted, agencies acted
primarily through adjudication, not rulemaking, and the choice of “set aside”
is consistent with reversing adjudications because “in prior judicial usage the
phrase was used for reversing judgments.”68 Finally, it was settled law when
Congress passed the APA in 1946 that nonparties could not benefit from a
judgment entered in someone else’s favor.69 Thus, even in the context of APA
cases, no law gives the courts the power to issue nationwide injunctions.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA AND
WILLIAMS V. ZBARAZ

An act of Congress governs everyone to whom its terms reach. 70 By
contrast, an injunction is a coercive remedy used to enforce a court’s
judgment,71 and, as the Supreme Court has made clear, “should be no more
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to
the plaintiffs.”72 The starting point for analyzing the propriety of any grant of
injunctive relief is the underlying judgment, which identifies the parties and
the outcome of the case. That is why the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in
United States v. Mendoza imposes a substantial roadblock to the nationwide
injunction practice.73 It does not permit a court to use an adverse judgment
against the federal government in any other case, and there is no material
difference between what Mendoza forbids and what numerous courts have
done through nationwide injunctions.
Mendoza involved the preclusive effect of a judgment entered against the
federal government in an earlier lawsuit involving the same legal issue but
different parties. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the federal
government cannot be estopped from relitigating the validity of a position
that it took in an earlier lawsuit that it lost. Mendoza effectively rejected every
defense of nationwide injunctions that their supporters make. As long as
Mendoza is good law, no court can enter a nationwide injunction against the
federal government outside of a class action.
67 Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 438 n.121.
68 Id.; see also Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124 (1894) (explaining that a challenge
to a patent-office adjudication is “a proceeding to set aside the conclusions reached by the
administrative department” and is analogous to “a suit to set aside a judgment”).
69 See, e.g., Litchfield v. Goodnow’s Administrator, 123 U.S. 549, 552 (1887) (No
judgment binds “a stranger to the proceedings.”); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (AM.
L. INST. 1942).
70 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so high
that he is above the law.”).
71 See, e.g., James Barr Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REV. 261, 261–
62 (1908); Siddique, supra note 2, at 2107.
72 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (quoting Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406, 420 (1977).
73 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
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At issue in Mendoza were the rules of issue and claim preclusion, which
were historically called issues of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Those
rules sought to simplify litigation by preventing the same parties from
relitigating a final judgment entered in a lawsuit between them. If A prevailed
against B in litigation, the final judgment resolved their dispute. That
judgment, however, did not affect the rights of C unless C had a close enough
relationship with A or B—called being in “privity” with A or B—to justify
treating C as the alter ego of one of them. 74 Over time, critics said that the
common law of claim and issue preclusion should apply more broadly, 75 and
the Supreme Court ultimately agreed. In 1971, the Court decided in BlonderTongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation that in suit by A against C,
C could make defensive use of a judgment against A in A’s prior suit against
B,76 and eighteen years later, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, the Court allowed
C to make “offensive” use of a judgment against B that was obtained in a prior
suit brought by A against B.77
Mendoza involved the Nationality Act of 1940, which had been amended
in 194278 to make it easier for foreigners who had served honorably in the U.S.
military during World War II to become American citizens by, for example,
waiving any residency requirement and permitting qualified applicants to be
naturalized overseas, rather than within the United States. 79 That system did
not work as planned in the Philippines, however, because because Japanese
occupation made U.S. naturalizations impossible until 1945.80 Moreover,
after gaining its independence from the United States in 1946, 81 the
Philippine government did not want to lose its citizens to this nation. 82 As the
result, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) did not send a
representative to the Philippines until 1945 and, even then, temporarily
halted all such naturalizations in the Philippines from October 1945 until
August 1946.83 The eligibility window under the amended Nationality Act of
1940, however, closed at the end of 1946.84 Sergio Mendoza sued, arguing
that his inability to apply for citizenship deprived him of due process of law. 85
74 See, e.g., Litchfield, 123 U.S. at 551–52.
75 See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 282 (1957); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 (AM. L. INST. 1982); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (3d ed. 2016).
76 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a defendant could plead res judicata against
a plaintiff patentee whose patent had been declared invalid in a prior proceeding).
77 439 U.S. 322, 333 (1979) (barring a defendant from relitigating an issue it lost in
earlier litigation).
78 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1005.
79 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 156 (1984).
80 Id.
81 Treaty of General Relations and Protocol, Phil.-U.S., July 4, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1568.
82 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 156.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 156–57.
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Pointing to the judgment entered against the government in an earlier lawsuit
involving the same claim,86 the district court held that the government was
precluded—viz., collaterally estopped—from relitigating that issue in
Mendoza.87 The district court entered judgment in Mendoza’s favor on that
ground. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. 88
The Court recognized that the collateral estoppel effect of a federal
court judgment was an issue of federal law, to be decided in the same way that
the Court resolved the issues in Blonder-Tongue and Parklane: by using the oldfashioned common law decision-making process of balancing the benefits and
costs of a proposed rule.89 At the outset, the Court noted that the federal
government occupied a unique position in federal court litigation, because it
was involved in a far greater number of cases than any private party was and
because many constitutional questions can only arise in the context of public
litigation.90 Allowing a nonparty to bind the federal government whenever it
lost a case, the Court reasoned, would have serious adverse consequences.
Principal among them was the damage that such a rule would do to the
Supreme Court’s own decision-making ability. The Court generally prefers to
wait until numerous lower courts, the legal profession, and the academy have
fully thrashed out an issue before taking it up. That approach—colloquially
known as allowing an issue to “percolate” in the lower courts—gives the Court
the opportunity to have the competing arguments fully debated so that the
Court can learn the correct, or at least best, answer to a legal issue. 91 Binding
the government everywhere and forever once it lost an issue—particularly an
important one, or one involving a matter of constitutional law—would
jeopardize that valuable educational approach, pithily described by Professor
Bray as, “[m]easure twice, cut once.”92 The federal government would be
compelled to appeal every adverse ruling, even if prudential concerns
militated against doing so in particular cases, to avoid having one district court
judge decide an issue for the entire nation.93 The Court declined to leave the
matter to a case-by-case balancing of the equities associated with each lower

86 See In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
87 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 157.
88 Id. at 164.
89 Id. at 162–63.
90 Id. at 159 (quoting INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam)).
91 See id. at 160 (“A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the
Government in such cases would substantially thwart the development of important
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.
Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from
permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants
certiorari. . . . Indeed, if nonmutual estoppel were routinely applied against the
Government, this Court would have to revise its practice of waiting for a conflict to develop
before granting the Government’s petitions for certiorari.”).
92 Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 422.
93 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161 (citing Brief for United States, at 30–31).
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court decision because of the uncertainty it would generate. That approach
“leaves the Government at sea because it cannot possibly anticipate, in
determining whether or not to appeal an adverse decision, whether a court
will bar relitigation of the issue in a later case.”94 As the result, the Court
unanimously held that a party cannot make offensive collateral estoppel use
of an adverse final judgment against the federal government.95
While Mendoza discusses the effect of a judgment at the back end of a
case, Williams v. Zbaraz discusses the “Case” or “Controversy” requirement at
the front end.96 The plaintiffs in Zbaraz challenged the constitutionality of an
Illinois law that declined to fund elective abortions, 97 on the ground that the
statute denied an indigent woman the right to obtain an abortion under Roe
v. Wade.98 Although the federal Hyde Amendment 99 imposed a parallel limit
on federal reimbursement for elective abortions, the plaintiffs did not claim
that that statute infringed on their rights.100 Nonetheless, the district court,
believing that the two statutes were closely interrelated, held both laws
unconstitutional.101 The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the district
court “lacked jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment” for two reasons: none of the parties had challenged the
constitutionality of that statute, and the district court could have awarded the
plaintiffs complete relief based only and entirely on a judgment in their favor
holding the Illinois law invalid.102 Under those circumstances, the Court held,
the district court acted in “the absence of a case or controversy sufficient to
permit an exercise” of the Article III judicial power.103 Zbaraz therefore stands
for the proposition that a district court lacks jurisdiction to grant a prevailing
party relief on an issue not in dispute in the case and unnecessary to fully
remedy the plaintiff’s injury. It logically follows that a district court lacks
jurisdiction to award relief to a nonparty as to whom there is, by definition,
no “Case” or “Controversy” with anyone before any litigation is brought.
The rationales that the Court found compelling in Mendoza and Zbaraz
apply perforce in any case involving a universal injunction. Indeed, there is
94 Id. at 162.
95 Id. at 155, 162. The literature on nationwide injunctions has only lightly touched
on the Mendoza decision. Most commentators either give the ruling short shrift or say that
it was wrongly decided and should be overruled. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 10, at 22.
96 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
97 Id. at 361.
98 Brief of Appellees at 22, Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (Nos. 79-4, 79-5,
79-491).
99 Since 1976, Congress has included a rider, known as the Hyde Amendment, on
Medicaid appropriations. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at 362 n.4. The Hyde Amendment prohibits the
use of federal funds to perform elective abortions. Id.
100 See id. at 361.
101 Id. at 365–66; see also Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(district court decision). The district court felt compelled to do so given an earlier order
by the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1216, 1221.
102 See Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at 367.
103 Id.
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little, if anything, that could be added to the Court’s discussions to
demonstrate why universal injunctions are unsound as a matter of policy.
Mendoza ensures that no one adverse judgment can foreclose the federal
government from implementing a statute or operating a program in
connection with persons not named in the judgment. That choice is for
Congress to undertake via the passage of a generally applicable “Law.”
Mendoza also avoids the unseemly forum shopping, and asymmetric
development of the law, that the contrary rule would encourage. After all,
there are hundreds of federal district court judges, and institutional litigants
have every incentive to find one to rule in their favor. Zbaraz complements
Mendoza by making clear that a court may not enter judgment on an issue that
is not in dispute between the parties. That being so, it should be immaterial
whether that judgment embraces issues or people outside of the original
dispute.104 The Court made that point in Hansberry v. Lee,105 holding that it is
a violation of due process when a judgment binds a person who is not
designated a party to the lawsuit, outside the limited exception for class
actions.106 When a court purports to do that, it is no longer deciding a case
or controversy but exercising Congress’s power to make laws of general
concern. But unlike Congress, the courts are not accountable to the people
when they exercise the legislative power. 107
To be sure, “freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular
legal issue”108 could be said to be a more efficient way of developing
contemporary legal doctrines, particularly in important cases of national
application, because it would force the government to make its best case the
first time an issue arises. But that approach forces the government to win
every lawsuit to avoid ever being bound by an adverse judgment. It also puts
tremendous pressure on the Supreme Court to loosen restraints imposed on
judicial decisionmaking by the doctrine of stare decisis. That doctrine
represents a judgment that a rule of law adopted by the courts ought to stand
unless there is a “special justification” for jettisoning it.109 Stare decisis seeks
to generate certainty in the law and confidence in the courts by requiring
rules of law to remain in place, except for extraordinary reasons, as individual
judges come and go. Put differently, the doctrine exists to prevent the law
104 See Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 471–72, 471 nn.311–12, 472 nn.313–
14.
105 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
106 See id. at 40–41; see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (“A judgment or
decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude
the rights of strangers to those proceedings.”); cf. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (discussed supra note 50).
107 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)
(holding that a legislature need not give hearings to people affected by legislation because
the public’s rights are protected by their ability to elect or remove legislators).
108 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
109 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
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from being batted back and forth like a tennis ball. If the Court were denied
the opportunity to wait until numerous lower courts had debated an issue,
there is a considerable risk that the Court would later conclude that its initial
answer was incorrect. Remorse over giving the wrong answer to a hastily
considered issue might increase the Court’s willingness to reconsider its initial
decisions, thereby weakening the benefits that stare decisis provides for the
legal system. Eliminating the flexibility that the Court enjoys at the front end
of the process—enjoys, that is, by allowing numerous lower courts to address
an issue—would force the Court to increase the flexibility it has at the “back
end”—by upping its willingness to overrule decisions that it now believes are
mistaken. That tradeoff does not improve the Court’s decision-making
process, but it does increase the risk that the law will be seen as up for grabs
and that the Justices will be seen as political actors, as members of Congress
in black robes rather than suits. That certainly would not be an improvement
in the fact or appearance of impartiality and legitimacy in the legal process.
Indeed, these considerations apply with even greater force to nationwide
injunctions than to the offensive use against the government of a prior adverse
judgment, as Parklane allows. A nationwide injunction has a greater impact
than the Parklane doctrine because it grants relief to third parties who never
file their own lawsuit. The possibility that the same judge who ruled against
the government in the first case will reconsider his or her ruling is far less
than the likelihood that a new judge might uncritically apply the first
judgment. People disagree over controversial issues, and judges are people,
so one or more judges are likely to disagree with whoever first decides a case.
That, in turn, increases the potential that additional judges will join them in
the debate, raising the possibility of a consensus emerging as to the correct or
best resolution that differs from the first decision.
Here’s an example. Witness what happened in the litigation over the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Between the dates that the Act went into
effect on November 1, 1987, and the Supreme Court upheld its
constitutionality on January 18, 1989, over various separation-of-powers
challenges, one circuit court and at least 145 district courts had ruled that the
Act was unconstitutional.110 Throughout that entire period, no one argued
that the federal government was everywhere and forever bound by the first
adverse district court ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the
rulings of all those courts in Mistretta v. United States and upheld the
Sentencing Reform Act over the same separation-of-powers challenges that
numerous lower courts had found persuasive.111 The Supreme Court might

110 Mark Nielsen, Comment, Mistretta v. United States and the Eroding Separation of
Powers, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1049, 1049 n.6 (1989).
111 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The Court later held that the mandatory nature of the
sentencing guidelines was unconstitutional on a materially different ground, the Sixth
Amendment Jury Trial Clause, not at issue in the cases leading up to Mistretta. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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not have been able to do so if the first district court ruling was dispositive.
The result is that the slow-but-steady system works.
Moreover, in cases where, before Mendoza, collateral estoppel might have
been asserted against the government, percolation serves only one purpose:
it allows multiple judges, parties, amici, and scholars to consider the issue and
prove the old adage that two (or more) heads are better than one. The issue
itself, however, is defined before collateral estoppel may be invoked. 112 In the
case of nationwide injunctions, though, percolation serves an additional
purpose: it narrows the issues of law and fact implicated by the challenged
law, rule, or policy. Whereas collateral estoppel may be invoked only after the
issue has been defined, a nationwide injunction may grant relief to third
parties even if their hypothetical cases raise quite different issues of law or fact
than the plaintiff’s. Because the Court’s rationale in Mendoza for rejecting the
Parklane doctrine applies with even greater force to nationwide injunctions
than it did to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, the Court’s rationale
in Mendoza forbids the use of nationwide injunctions. 113
CONCLUSION
Both the Constitution and the Judicial Code, as informed by the lessons
of history, are relevant to the legality of nationwide injunctions in two ways.
They authorize federal courts to award relief to the parties in a particular
“Case” or “Controversy,” and they prohibit the courts from entering a
judgment that is tantamount to the type of “Law” that only Congress can pass.
Nationwide injunctions cross the line separating the former from the latter
because they are unnecessary to provide complete relief to the prevailing
party, and they prevent the federal government from enforcing an act of
Congress against nonparties. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Mendoza and
Zbaraz reinforce the evident meaning of the Constitution and Judicial Code
by prohibiting federal courts from granting relief beyond the specific parties
and claims at issue in a particular case. To uphold nationwide injunctions,
112 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 75, § 4417 (examining the various ways
that lower courts define the issue and decide whether it is the same as one previously
litigated before applying collateral estoppel).
113 Professor Clopton argues that “national-injunction cases are seemingly weak
candidates for a percolation argument, given that they proceed quickly to appellate (if not
Supreme Court) review and involve numerous interveners and amici curiae who can
provide the functional equivalent of district-court percolation.” Clopton, supra note 10, at
38–39. That argument ignores Mendoza and, in any event, is quite unconvincing. First,
speed is not an unadulterated good. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 139 S. Ct.
599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay) (noting that nationwide
injunctions may lead to “rushed, high-stakes, low-information decisions”). Second,
whatever “functional equivalent” to percolation interveners and amici provide would only
be increased if they had more time to craft their arguments while cases percolated below.
Third, Professor Clopton’s argument merely assumes that every national injunction case
will attract the attention of sufficient interveners and amici to provide that functional
equivalent.
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the Court would need to overrule Mendoza and Zbaraz because nationwide
injunctions effectively nullify those decisions. Unless and until Congress
endorses that practice, the federal courts should limit relief to the parties to
a lawsuit.

